Integrity Initiative/Leak/1

Cyberguerilla

 Integrity Initiative/Leak/1(Integrity Initiative/Leak)

File:Integrity Initiative Leak 1.png
Date	5 November 2018
Location	Cyberguerilla
Exposed	Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Austria, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Baltics, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Central-Eastern Europe, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/France, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Germany, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Greece, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Italy, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Netherlands, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Nordic, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Spain, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/UK, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/US-Canada, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/Ukraine, Integrity Initiative/Cluster/UK/Journalists
Description	The first of many leaks which exposed covertly organised groups of Russophobic academics, journalists, government officers and deep state operatives who strategised about how to alert to people to a purported Russian "threat".
Perpetrators	'Anonymous'

The first tranche of the Integrity Initiative Leak was posted on 5^th November 2018. This revealed that the group had covertly organised groups of Russophobic academics, journalists, government officers and deep state operatives who strategised about how to alert to people to a purported Russian "threat". Their preoccupation with this threat, and their insistence upon secrecy was clear from the first leak. Six subsequent leaks gradually exposed the scope of the multi-million pound project who was shown to directly involving hundreds of people.

Exposures

File:Integrity Initiative Moncloa campaign.jpg

The first leak included a timeline of the Moncloa campaign, initiated on 07 06 2018. This was a covert smear campaign to prevent the appointment of Pedro Baños as Director of the Spanish Department of Homeland Security.

{{#subobject: |Has superobject=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1 |Has objectClass=Quotation |Has author=unknown|+sep=, |Has text=“We engage only very discreetly with governments, based entirely on trusted personal contacts, specifically to ensure that they do not come to see our work as a problem, and to try toinfluence them gently, as befits an independent NGO operation like ours” |Is about=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1,|+sep=, |Has wikipediaPage= |Has location=|+sep=, |Has publicationDate=2018 |Sourced from=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1#Top 3 deliverables (for FCO).pdf |Has sourceDetails= |Has sourceTitle= |Has sourceName=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1#Top 3 deliverables (for FCO).pdf |Has sourceURL=

}}

“We engage only very discreetly with governments, based entirely on trusted personal contacts, specifically to ensure that they do not come to see our work as a problem, and to try toinfluence them gently, as befits an independent NGO operation like ours”
unknown (2018) 

Response

On 26 November 2018, the Integrity Initiative admitted that some documents had been hacked, but declined to state whether any particular documents were authentic, leaving the way clear for possible future claims that some were forged. A UK Foreign Office spokesperson stated that: {{#subobject: |Has superobject=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1 |Has objectClass=Quotation |Has author=|+sep=, |Has text=“The Institute for Statecraft [Integrity Initiative’s parent organisation], an independent charity, was hacked several weeks ago and numerous documents were published and amplified by Kremlin news channels.

The Russian state media campaign’s objective is clear. This is yet another example of Russian disinformation intended to confuse audiences and discredit an organisation which is working independently to tackle the threat of disinformation.” |Is about=Integrity Initiative/Leak/1,Integrity Initiative/Leak|+sep=, |Has wikipediaPage= |Has location=|+sep=, |Has publicationDate=12 November |Sourced from=Huffington post |Has sourceDetails= |Has sourceTitle= |Has sourceName=Huffington post |Has sourceURL=https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/labour-russia-conspiracy-theory_uk_5bfec50fe4b0425d70c0bac0

}}

“The Institute for Statecraft [Integrity Initiative’s parent organisation], an independent charity, was hacked several weeks ago and numerous documents were published and amplified by Kremlin news channels. The Russian state media campaign’s objective is clear. This is yet another example of Russian disinformation intended to confuse audiences and discredit an organisation which is working independently to tackle the threat of disinformation.”
 (12 November) 

Reporting

The leak aroused great interest from alternative media, including RT.

It was not widely reported in UK commercially-controlled media.

Next Leak

Full article: Integrity Initiative/Leak/2

The second Integrity Initiative leak was posted 24 days later, on 29 November 2018.

References